INTRODUCTION
Synthetic biology is one of the fastest developing and most promising emerging technologies. 1 It will permit scientists to design living organisms unlike any found in nature and to redesign existing organisms to have enhanced or novel qualities. 2 While traditional biotechnology involves the transfer of a small amount of genetic material from one species to another, synthetic biology will permit the purposeful assembly of an entire organism. Synthetically designed organisms, it is hoped, might be put to myriad beneficial uses, including better detection and treatment of disease, the remediation of environmental pollutants, and the production of new sources of energy, medicines, and other valuable products. 3 Engineered life forms, however, also might pose risks to human health and the environment. Exactly what those hazards are and how they might be controlled cannot be fully determined in advance of the very research necessary to develop this novel science in the first instance.
This Article discusses potential regulatory challenges under the existing U.S. regulatory system concerning the first synthetic biology organisms that are anticipated to be commercialized. Much of the policy and ethical commentary on synthetic biology to date has focused on biosecurity concerns associated with synthetic biology, such as the potential malevolent misuse of the technology for bioterrorism, or the possibility of accidental or intentional release of a harmful engineered organism into the community by "do it yourself" ("DIY") synthetic biology users. 4 While these implications of synthetic biology are of great importance, our focus here is different. We address regulatory and oversight concerns and challenges, and provide recommended strategies for dealing with the potential risks to human health and the environment from the purposeful, beneficial application of synthetic biology. Private companies, universities, and other entities are fast developing numerous legitimate uses of synthetic biology, in areas such as energy production, chemical synthesis, and bioremediation. 5 These anticipated uses 1. Synthetic biology has been described as "arguably the world's hottest and most poorly defined scientific discipline." Paul Voosen, Synthetic Biology Comes Down to Earth 5. Other analyses have addressed these issues from a more general and sometimes international perspective. See, e.g., INT'L RISK GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, supra note 3; MICHAEL do not come without risk, risk that is sometimes referred to as "bioerror" as opposed to "bioterror." 6 To date, the capacity of the existing regulatory system to address these bioerror risks has received limited attention and investigation, particularly in the legal literature.
Our analysis reveals that although the extant regulatory system is capable of sufficiently handling several aspects of these novel synthetic biology organisms, there are also a number of potentially troubling regulatory gaps. These gaps arise because synthetic biology presents particular challenges for the existing U.S. regulatory regime due to three atypical characteristics of this nascent technology: (1) synthetic biology organisms can evolve; 7 (2) the traditional assumed relationship between mass and risk may break down for synthetic biology products; 8 and (3) the conventional regulatory focus of existing statutes on end-product chemicals may be a poor match in certain instances for a technology that produces novel organisms, with their own attendant risks, that, in turn, produce the end-product chemicals. 9 This Article begins in Part I with an overview of synthetic biology and an examination of the potential benefits and risks of expected early synthetic biology products. The Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA") is anticipated to be the most significant pre-existing regulatory authority concerning potential human health and environmental impacts of synthetic biology. Part II will examine how well TSCA is suited for this role. Part III discusses a number of other statutes, including laws pertaining to hazardous waste, endangered species, and pesticides, as well as National Institutes of Health guidelines that will also play a role in synthetic biology management. 10 Part IV introduces several innovative governance approaches that could shore up some of the gaps in the existing regulatory framework for synthetic biology. (2010) . We seek to drill down one level deeper here and evaluate the specific statutory and regulatory programs in the United States that will apply to some of these products potentially presenting environmental and health risks that will primarily fall within the regulatory jurisdiction of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). As with other emerging technologies, the legal and regulatory structure is incapable of evolving as rapidly as technological advance. In such cases, "soft law" approaches can provide a valuable alternative, one which can provide faster and more flexible governance that permits a promising technology to develop as rapidly as possible while adequately guarding against its potential environmental and human health risks.
I. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
Synthetic biology brings the concept of engineering to biology in order to design living organisms. 11 Although there are many different definitions of synthetic biology, 12 all recognize this emerging field as based on the understanding that DNA sequences can be assembled together like building blocks, producing a living entity with any desired combination of traits, much as one can assemble a car by putting together many individual pieces with different functions.
Synthetic biology is in its infancy as a technological field. This budding technology will use genes and other DNA sequences as interchangeable biological parts to build a target organism. The BioBricks Foundation has already developed a catalog of standardized genetic sequences that perform specified biological functions when inserted into a microorganism. 13 Concurrently, other scientists are trying to develop a simplified genome, designed to contain the minimal genetic code necessary to survive and replicate. 14 This minimal genome could then be used as a chassis to which genetic material coding for particular desired traits can be added. 15 In this manner, synthetic organisms could be designed to perform myriad functions. Scientists have already achieved the first successful transfer of a synthetic genome into a bacterial cell that has had all its original genetic information removed. 16 Synthetic biology represents a giant leap forward from the current generation of genetically modified organisms created by recombinant DNA. Current genetic modification methods involve adding, modifying, or deleting one, or at most a few, genes within an organism. 17 Synthetic biology, on the other hand, involves the creation of novel DNA sequences that may have never existed before in living organisms, or the widespread substitution, addition, or combination of entire or partial genomes. 18 The difference between the two can be analogized to the difference between the now largely obsolete correcting typewriter that permitted small corrections in the text limited to a few characters or at most a couple lines, with the modern word processor which is capable of creating, editing, and moving large sections of text.
Synthetic biology is expected to provide significant benefits across a wide variety of fronts. Medical advances could include better disease detection, molecular devices for tissue repair and regeneration, molecules utilizing a sensor and enzymes to identify and attack disease targets such as tumors, personalized medicine, rapid development of vaccines, and cells with new properties to improve human health. 19 As one example, synthetic biology may allow for less expensive production of biopharmaceuticals. 20 Drugs that are currently expensively produced from natural sources, such as the anticancer drug taxol and the anti-HIV compound prostratin, could be produced inexpensively through the engineering of cells to produce the compounds in large quantities. 21 Synthetic biology is expected to produce a variety of environmental and energy benefits, including the production of chemicals in more environmentally friendly manners, bioremediation, pollutant detection, and less expensive and more efficient energy production. 22 Biosensors could be designed to signal the presence of environmental contaminants, including chemical pollutants and weapons. 23 Engineered microorganisms may be able to remediate some of the most hazardous environmental pollutants, such as heavy metals, hazardous waste, and nuclear waste, 24 as converting agricultural waste into useful products such as ethanol. 25 Microorganisms such as algae, bacteria, or yeast could be redesigned using synthetic biology to produce a new generation of biofuels that reduce pollution from both the production and use of the fuel. 26 Synthetic cells may provide a future generation of faster, less expensive, and even self-repairing computers and robotic technologies. 27 For example, synthetic biologists have recently figured out how to program proteins to perform basic calculations, producing the first "cellular calculator." 28 Other scientists have been able to make the cellular structure of an amoeba interface with, and process sensory signals from, a robot. 29 Synthetic organisms may also be designed to biologically produce other proteins and chemicals with a variety of industrial, agricultural, or environmental applications, 30 all more efficiently, for lower cost, and using fewer natural resources than is currently possible. 31 For all its potentially wondrous advances and benefits, synthetic biology also poses a variety of potential risks. A primary concern involves the accidental or intentional release of synthetic organisms into the environment. 32 Uncontrolled release raises concerns that range from environmental damage to bioterrorism. For engineered organisms intended to be released into the environment, scientists are developing potential controls, such as making synthetic organisms dependent on non-naturally occurring nutrients or designing the organisms to self-destruct if a population spurt or density occurs. 33 32. Society's approach to synthetic biology raises other potential areas of concern beyond direct risks to human health or the environment. These could include concerns regarding global trade, justice, intellectual property rights, and other issues, as well as social, religious, and philosophical questions regarding modifying or creating life forms. These issues raise a variety of questions that have few simple answers. This Article focuses on the human health and environmental risks of synthetic biology.
33. BALMER & MARTIN, supra note 27, at 17.
agricultural purposes or for bioremediation, could fail, leading to environmental or human health impacts. 34 For example, intentionally released synthetic organisms could mutate or interact with other organisms and the environment in unexpected ways, leading to unanticipated proliferation or to synthetic organisms passing their synthetic genes to natural species. 35 Thus, controls are not guarantees; living systems are very complex and can be unpredictable. 36 Synthetic biology circuits developed so far, for instance, have tended "to mutate rapidly and become nonfunctional." 37 As with other emerging technologies, the challenge of guarding against synthetic biology risks while maintaining a safe environment in which the potentially enormous benefits of synthetic biology can be pursued will fall primarily upon federal regulatory agencies. These agencies will have to seek this delicate balance while operating pursuant to a statutory and regulatory system designed largely prior to the advent of synthetic biology, or even the advent of the earlier generation of conventional, genetically modified products. 38 The uncertainty surrounding emerging synthetic biology technology, and its attendant potential benefits and risks, will create significant challenges for the U.S. regulatory system. Regulatory systems, almost always, are designed for technologies existing at the time of the regulatory systems' formation and are based on the then-current understanding of that technology. Such systems often face difficulty and disruption when applied to newly emerging technologies. 39 The first synthetic biology organisms expected to be commercialized include microorganisms engineered to produce biofuels, for chemical production, and for bioremediation. 40 The following sections provide background on each of these nascent technologies, describe how each may be used, and evaluate potential scenarios for exposure and risks to human health or the environment. 
A. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY ALGAE FOR BIOFUEL PRODUCTION
Biofuels are one of the most promising new sustainable energy technologies for meeting the nation's energy needs, particularly in the transportation sector. First generation biofuels such as ethanol from corn have important limitations, including competition with food uses of the corn, loss of ecosystems, increases in food prices, and, depending on the production method, limited or even negligible environmental benefits over their lifecycle. 41 Accordingly, second and third generation biofuels produced from non-food biomass are being pursued as a more sustainable, long-term solution, 42 and single-cell algae (or microalgae) and cyanobacteria (or bluegreen algae) (collectively, "algae") are leading candidates for the production of advanced biofuels. 43 While many researchers and companies are pursuing the development of algal cells for biofuel production using naturally occurring or genetically engineered strains, synthetic biology may offer the greatest potential for producing large quantities of sustainable biofuels by creating new strains of algae. 44 The likely use of synthetic biology algae for biofuel production presents significant opportunities, but also raises new concerns. The advantages of algae engineered using synthetic biology for energy production are summarized next, followed by a discussion of the potential risks.
Advantages of Synthetic Biology Algae for Biofuel Production
Genetic engineering of algae, especially synthetic biology algae, has enormous potential to improve biofuel production in algae and help make it 41 economically competitive with other fuel types and sources. 45 There are many types of algae, but of particular importance for the production of biofuels are microalgae and cyanobacteria. These organisms are single-celled, capture sunlight through photosynthesis, and use the stored energy to convert inorganic substances into simple sugars. 46 Despite many similarities, there are some significant differences between microalgae and cyanobacteria. For example, unlike algae, cyanobacteria do not naturally produce oils, thus limiting the types of biofuels they can produce. 47 Another important difference is that algal cells must be destroyed to extract their products, while cyanobacteria secrete their products into the inter-cellular media, simplifying the extraction process. 48 Despite these differences, as the primitive ancestors of modern plants, microalgae and cyanobacetria have relatively simple cellular systems, and as a result can devote virtually all their cellular resources to the conversion of solar energy into biomass. 49 Additionally, the lack of multicellular structure allows microalgae and cyanobacetria to remain in aqueous suspension where their cellular surface area has maximum contact with nutrients such as carbon dioxide. 50 In recent years, there has been a surge of interest in utilizing algae for renewable fuel production. The policy objectives to reducing reliance on foreign energy and slowing the increase in greenhouse gas emissions have catalyzed this interest. 51 For example, Exxon has given $600 million to Synthetic Genomics, Inc. to bioengineer algae to produce "'biocrude' 52 . . . that can be refined into gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. To be commercially successful, biofuels from algae must be equivalent or superior in performance and costs to competing liquid fuels, which include gasoline, diesel, natural gas, and biofuels (e.g., ethanol) produced from other sources of biomass such as corn, cellulosic plant material, and non-algal microbes (e.g., bacteria or yeast (i.e., biocrude). 54 Microalgae and cyanobacteria can potentially produce a variety of biofuel feedstocks including lipids for making biodiesel and jet fuel, "hydrocarbons and isoprenoids for gasoline production and carbohydrates for ethanol production." 55 These biofuels provide many environmental benefits-for example, " [b] 57 This carbon sequestration potentially makes them attractive to renewable fuel advocates. Although the biofuel will release greenhouse gasses when burned for energy, the fuel was created by cells that sequestered carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Consequently, making biofuel from algae is nearly carbon neutral other than the indirect carbon emissions from the energy sources used in the refining and growing processes, since the amount of carbon dioxide released when the fuel is burned is equivalent to the carbon dioxide captured from the air when the fuel is produced, producing no net increase in carbon emissions. 58 The high production capability of algae makes them an attractive source for biofuels. Algae can proliferate at a very rapid rate, doubling their mass in as little as 24 hours. 59 They can also accumulate high concentrations of oils or other feedstocks that can be used for fuel or fuel production. 60 Cyanobacteria and microalgae can convert as much as ten and five percent, respectively, of the sun's energy into biomass, compared to one percent by traditional energy crops such as corn or sugarcane. 61 Under favorable growth conditions, some algae species can produce as much as 50 to 70% of their dry weight in the form of oils. 62 This tremendous production potential would enable algae to produce up to 58,700 liters of oil per hectare of cultivation, which is one to 54 63 Algae grow to high densities and have high per-acre productivity, providing for efficient mass cultivation. 64 They are also extremely hearty organisms that thrive all over the planet and can survive in extreme conditions, such as salt water, waste water, and on land otherwise ill-suited for agriculture, which is another reason they can be more efficient for fuel production. 65 Notwithstanding the enormous hopes and expectations of microalgae biofuel production, many technological hurdles remain to widespread commercial production. One, for example, is the much needed progress in the economic scale-up of such production. 66 Moreover, existing microalgae strains need large quantities of energy, water, and nutrients for growing and processing, which makes commercial production unsustainable using existing strains. 67 Unlike high value synthetic biology products such as medicines or vaccines, the value per gallon of a fuel (regardless of how it is produced) is only a few dollars, which creates challenges in producing large quantities of such "low-end" products economically. 68 A National Academy of Sciences report in 2012 concluded that "the scale-up of algal biofuel production sufficient to meet at least 5 percent of U.S. demand for transportation fuels would place unsustainable demands on energy, water, and nutrients with current technologies and knowledge." 69 Improvements in many algal traits are required to reduce the environmental effects per unit of fuel produced and to enhance economic viability, 70 and synthetic biology holds promise for making progress on these goals. 71 Due to their simple single-cell structure, algae make easy targets for extensive genetic manipulation compared to higher plants. Scientists could engineer a number of helpful traits into algae to improve their biofuel production. Traits for producing different types of hydrocarbons could be used for improved biofuels, for secreting oils into the environment so the cells do not need to be harvested to extract their products, for better utilizing atmospheric carbon dioxide as a carbon source, and to grow faster and stronger algae in a variety of different environments, including salt water and stressed environments. 72 Although there are benefits, there are some limits to the maximization of algal biofuel output from the utilization of synthetic biology. Examples include the likelihood that synthetic genetics can only boost output to the point where the organism reaches its metabolic limit and that the synthetic phenotypes may not be optimal for organism survival and reproduction. 73 Consequently, there is the risk that synthetic phenotypes may be deselected through the process of natural selection in favor of natural traits that may be more genetically competitive. 74 However, synthetic biology may be better capable of overcoming these barriers than traditional genetic engineering techniques. Indeed, recent news stories quote American biologist Craig Venter as saying that genetic modification of natural algal strains to produce biofuels will not achieve the performance levels required to compete with existing energy sources, and that new synthetic forms of algae will be required. 75 
Risks of Synthetic Biology Algae
The major safety and regulatory concerns about synthetic biology algae will be the environmental release, exposure, and risks of the engineered organisms. 76 A key factor influencing such concerns will be whether the algae are grown in open (i.e., open pond systems) or closed (bioreactor) systems. 77 Most commercial cultivation of algae is currently carried out in open pond systems. 78 Open cultivation utilizes uncovered "ponds" that can be either manmade or naturally occurring. By their nature, these ponds are open and exposed to the external environment. Although this open cultivation model is the easiest and least expensive way to grow algae, there are some drawbacks to this approach. 79 Open cultivation is exposed to various types of ambient changes (seasonal, weather, light, pH) that can affect growth. In addition, open systems are subject to two-way contamination, in which viruses or other pathogens can infect the pond in which the algae is grown, or cells of the cultivated algae may escape into the environment. 80 Open pond systems also require larger areas of land than closed systems. 81 The other principal but more expensive cultivation method involves photobioreactors to create a closed environment for cultivation, where conditions can be monitored and controlled. Consequently, cultivation can be maximized through a careful, controlled balancing of the variables. For example, algae grown in plastic tubes in ponds provide up to seven times the productivity of open ponds. 82 Another comparative advantage of closed systems is the protection against unintended contamination or release of the algae. 83 Even with contained uses, however, the risk of accidental environmental release is not zero, although it is less than open cultivation. 84 If synthetic biology algae products are accidentally released into the environment, risks to the natural environment or human health will be very uncertain. 85 Naturally occurring algal blooms can cause large-scale fish kills and result in toxic effects in humans and animals that ingest affected waters, and it is possible that genetically engineered microalgae could cause similar or greater environmental and health risks if they escape and proliferate. 86 Modified synthetic biology algae could be transported through the air for long distances and could survive a variety of harsh environments in dormant form. 87 The risks of the release of most genetically engineered organisms into the environment create some uncertainty, and given the more substantial modifications made possible by synthetic biology, it is likely that any environmentally released synthetic biology algae will create even greater uncertainties. 88 Some of the uncertainties include: (1) the likelihood and rate of accidental release; (2) the survivability of the synthetic biology algae in the surrounding environment; (3) its ability to reproduce, spread, and compete in the natural environment; and (4) the mechanisms and magnitude of any possible risks to the environment or human health. 89 
B. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY ORGANISMS DESIGNED FOR CHEMICAL PRODUCTION
Synthetic biology may also permit scientists to engineer microorganisms into "living factories" that can produce valuable chemical products. products through metabolic engineering. This is accomplished by transferring genetic material that produces a particular substance, such as a useful enzyme or protein, to a host microorganism that can be readily manipulated to express that substance. 90 Current biological production, however, often relies on nonrenewable resources and limited natural resources. 91
Advantages of Synthetic Biology for Chemical Production
Synthetic biology will permit the design of microorganisms that produce chemicals metabolically with greater precision and efficiency than currently possible, and also will allow the engineering of microorganisms to produce chemicals that cannot currently be manufactured biologically. 92 These designed microorganisms can be tailor-made for particular chemical production processes that rely on widely available and inexpensive starting materials (primarily certain sugars) to produce a broader array of valuable output chemical products. 93 The great advantage of the biological production of chemicals is that it can be accomplished at lower cost, using fewer natural resources, and with lower environmental impact than certain traditional chemical production methods. 94 Scientists are expected to be able to design microorganisms to produce basic commodity chemicals such as solvents, feed additives, agricultural chemicals, and certain polymers. 95 More advanced chemical products, including enzymes, vitamins, antibiotics, and nutraceuticals, may also be manufactured. 96 DuPont has developed a semi-synthetic bacteria that lives on cornstarch and produces a chemical useful for manufacturing high-tech fabrics. 97 This synthetic bacterium may become the first $1 billion nonpharmaceutical biotechnology product. 98 Other developments include a synthetic antibiotic, a building block for Spandex, and work on a synthetic biology microorganism that would produce rubber. 99 Pharmaceutical ingredients that are too complex to be chemically synthesized may also be produced. 100 compounds that are found in or derived from plants and commonly used in drugs, are likely targets for synthetic biology production. 101 Synthetic biology may be used to more efficiently produce a precursor to artemisinin, a naturally occurring drug that is highly effective in treating malaria, but is in short supply. 102 The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation donated over $40 million to promote research concerning the development of synthetic artemisinin. 103 Taxol, a widely used anticancer compound, and hydrocortisone are other examples of pharmaceuticals that may be produced less expensively and more efficiently through synthetic biology than current methods. 104 
Risks of Synthetic Biology in Chemical Production
While manufacturers have a long history of synthetic chemical production, using synthetic biology microbes to produce chemicals biologically creates new risks. As the Presidential Commission on the Study of Bioethical Issues found, "[u]nlike synthetically produced chemicals, which generally have well-defined and predictable qualities, biological organisms may be more difficult to control." 105 Although much synthetic biology chemical production is expected to take place in contained environments, this does not eliminate potential risks from unintentional release into the environment.
Further, the development of synthetic biology for chemical production also creates a risk that individuals with malicious intent could try to use toxic or pathogenic synthetic biology microorganisms for illegal activities, such as bioterrorism. 106 The U.S. government has developed certain recommendations to try to reduce these risks, but the synthetic biology field is in an early stage of development and understanding the contours of potential risks necessarily remains at a developmental stage as well. 107 
C. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY MICROORGANISMS DESIGNED FOR BIOREMEDIATION
In addition to producing biofuels and chemicals, one of the most promising uses of synthetic biology involves the potential to revolutionize the remediation of hazardous substances. 108 Bioremediation refers to the use of microorganisms to reduce or remove contaminants from the environment. Bioremediation is already common in oil spills, as several species of bacteria naturally consume and degrade certain petroleum components into less toxic byproducts. 109 To date, however, traditional genetic engineering of bacteria for bioremediation has been a bit of a disappointment. There have been significant difficulties with how the bacteria interact in the environment, the ability of the bacteria to compete and survive in the wild, and the low bioavailability of certain compounds. 110 In most cases, genetically modified bacteria have not done any better at bioremediation than their naturally occurring counterparts. 111 Synthetic biology may provide a more promising alternative, the advantages and risks of which are discussed in more detail below.
Advantages of Synthetic Biology Bioremediation
Synthetic biology may permit the redesign of microbes to better remediate petroleum-based contamination and the engineering of novel microorganisms that can break down "more recalcitrant chemicals such as dioxins, pesticides, [and] radioactive compounds." 112 Because synthetic biology microorganisms could be designed from scratch, as opposed to being dependent on naturally-occurring genetic material, they could be engineered to be more viable in the natural environment and to target particular pollutants of concern. 113 These microorganisms may be able to more efficiently remediate a variety of environmental contaminants while having less of a negative impact on the environment than traditional remediation methods. 114 
Synthetic Biology Bioremediation Risks
Synthetic biology microbes engineered for bioremediation raise particular concerns because their use necessarily entails the intentional release of synthetic organisms into the environment. 115 Although most synthetic biology microbes released into the environment would likely not be able to outcompete natural strains, 116 interact with other organisms and the environment in unexpected ways, leading to unanticipated proliferation or to synthetic microbes passing their non-natural genes to natural species. 117 In a worst-case scenario, synthetic biology microbes could compete or crossbreed with natural organisms, threatening the existence or ecosystem of those natural organisms. 118 Exacerbating this concern, synthetic biology microbes designed for bioremediation will need to be designed to be more robust in order to survive in the natural world as opposed to a laboratory environment. 119 This may make them more competitive in relation to naturally occurring organisms and more difficult to control. The lack of any evolutionary or ecological history, and the potential for unpredicted and unpredictable properties and interactions, will make evaluating the consequences of a release difficult. 120 Scientists are developing potential controls, such as designing "terminator genes" or "kill switches" making synthetic organisms dependent on non-naturally occurring nutrients, or designing organisms to self-destruct if a triggering stimulus or population spurt or density occurs. 121 But, controls are not guarantees. Living systems are complex and unpredictable. Unknown interactions between an organism and its ecosystem only exacerbate this uncertainty. 122 Because a synthetic biology organism could evolve or exchange genetic material with another organism, the potential controls may not be fully secure. 123 Finally, because they are living microorganisms and may be able to reproduce, synthetic biology microbes, once released, may be extremely difficult or even impossible to eliminate from the environment. 124 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has experience with testing and monitoring environmental releases of traditionally genetically modified microbes, including microbes developed for bioremediation, but, as make-fuel-out-of-algae-poses-ris-80037.html ("Changes biologists are making to the algae are designed to make them 'big and fat and happy,' to optimize their oil output . . . . When you do that, 'they generally don't survive out in the world.'" (quoting Stephen Mayfield, Director of San Diego Center for Algae Biotechnology)).
117. discussed above, synthetic biology microbes may present additional challenges.
II. REGULATING SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
Synthetic biology thus presents many wondrous advances, but this potential does not come without attendant risks, risks that must be managed in some manner. As with other technologies, synthetic biology is not regulated as a technology per se. Rather, pursuant to the 1986 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, synthetic biology, like earlier generations of biotechnology products before it, will be regulated based on particular product categories and particular uses. 125 As such, any synthetic biology microbes will be regulated pursuant to existing environmental and human health protection statutes.
The primary responsibility for governing the risks of synthetic biology products will fall to the EPA under the TSCA. In addition, depending on the particular products and uses, synthetic biology organisms may also be regulated pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; and the Endangered Species Act. The next section critically analyzes the regulatory framework governing synthetic biology products under TSCA, followed by a section which provides an equivalent analysis for the other environmental and human health statutes pertinent to synthetic biology.
A. THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT
The TSCA regulates the production, use, and disposal of hazardous chemical substances. 126 TSCA was intended as a "gap filling" statute to fill in the regulatory interstices that are not covered by other statutes. 127 Thus, unlike most other environmental statutes, TSCA is not limited by the medium in which the chemicals are released or the manner in which the chemicals are used, and therefore is one of the broadest environmental statutes in scope. In addition, TSCA permits regulation of chemical substances before, during, and after their use. 128 For these reasons, TSCA is likely the most important statute concerning the regulation of synthetic biology microbes engineered for biofuel production, chemical production, and bioremediation. The most important provision of TSCA for purposes of the oversight of synthetic biology products is section 5, which requires manufacturers of new chemical substances or significant new uses of existing chemicals to submit a "premanufacturing notice" ("PMN") to the EPA before commercial production. 130 133 Also distinct for genetically modified microorganisms and for precommercialization field trials of genetically engineered microbes, the manufacturer must submit a TSCA Experimental Release Application ("TERA") to the EPA at least 60 days prior to commencing field testing. 134 While these pre-market notification requirements of TSCA have been the primary focus of the EPA's oversight of genetically engineered microbial products to date, various other provisions of TSCA could also apply to genetically engineered microbes in appropriate circumstances and are discussed below.
B. THRESHOLD CONCERNS: ARE SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY ORGANISMS WITHIN TSCA'S PURVIEW?
There are two threshold regulatory authority issues concerning the regulation of synthetic biology organisms pursuant to TSCA: (1) Whether living microorganisms are subject to TSCA in the first instance; and (2) whether the definition of intergeneric engineered microorganisms under TSCA might restrict the EPA's regulatory authority with respect to synthetic biology organisms. 1. Are Synthetic Biology Organisms "Chemical Substances"?
TSCA was enacted to regulate the release of "chemical substances" into the environment. 135 "Chemical substance" is defined broadly under TSCA to include "any organic or inorganic substance of a particular molecular identity, including-(i) any combination of such substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical reaction or occurring in nature; and (ii) any element or uncombined radical." 136 When Congress enacted TSCA in 1976, it gave no indication that it anticipated the inclusion of living microorganisms within the definition of "chemical substance." 137 The EPA has concluded that Congress intended "chemical substance" to be defined broadly to encompass living microorganisms 138 and consequently has relied on TSCA to regulate biotechnology products for over 25 years. To the extent that synthetic biology creates new regulatory controversies under TSCA, it could conceivably lead to a challenge to the EPA's interpretation that living microorganisms are "chemical substances" under TSCA.
Some commentators question TSCA's authority to reach living microorganisms. 139 The strongest argument against the EPA's interpretation is that living microorganisms do not generally have a "particular molecular identity" pursuant to the definition of chemical substance. 140 The EPA contends that Congress defined the term "chemical substance" broadly and non-inclusively, and furthermore that a cell could be described as a combination of chemicals occurring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical reaction or "occurring in nature." 141 It is likely that the EPA's definition would prevail in a legal challenge under the Chevron doctrine, which requires reviewing courts to defer to an agency's "reasonable" interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision. 142 However, if challenged, there is a possibility that a court could invalidate the EPA's approach, leaving the EPA without any statutory authority to regulate modified microorganisms. Moreover, the mere possibility of such a challenge and adverse outcome may deter the EPA, at least at the margin, from regulating as aggressively as it otherwise might consider appropriate.
2. Does the EPA's Definition of "Intergeneric" Limit Synthetic Biology Regulation?
As described above, the EPA regulations under TSCA require manufacturers of new intergeneric engineered microorganisms to submit an MCAN to the EPA prior to commercialization of the product. 143 Intergeneric microorganisms are defined as organisms "formed by the deliberate combination of genetic material . . . from organisms of different taxonomic genera." 144 The EPA's policy is based on traditional genetic modification techniques and the premise that the transfer of genetic information from more distantly related organisms (i.e., organisms from different genera) are more likely to create new or modified traits that could present a risk. 145 Specifically, the EPA found that intergeneric microorganisms should be singled out for regulatory scrutiny "because of the degree of human intervention involved, the significant likelihood of creating new combinations of traits, and the greater uncertainty regarding the effects of such microorganisms on human health and the environment." 146 Synthetic biology, as opposed to traditional genetic modification, raises the possibility of introducing wholly synthetic genes or gene fragments (i.e., DNA sequences that do not exist in nature) into an organism. 147 Similarly, synthetic biology may allow scientists to remove a gene fragment from an organism, modify that fragment, and then reinsert it back into the same organism. 148 In either case, such organisms may not be "intergeneric" under the EPA's regulatory definition because they would not include genetic material from organisms of different genera. 149 148. As one study noted, "if individual genetic components or whole genomes are able to be designed using a computer and then chemically synthesised, concepts of 'recipient' and 'donor' organisms may lose their significance." Zhang et al., supra note 6, at 8.
149. With the advent of synthetic biology, the EPA's distinction between intergeneric and non-intergeneric microorganisms actually runs afoul of the Coordinated Framework's dictates language using "intergeneric" as the differentiating principle would appear to exclude many synthetic microorganisms from regulatory review, the EPA's stated rationale for focusing on intergeneric microorganisms-degree of human intervention, potential for new combinations, and greater uncertainty-should apply even more strongly to synthetic biology microorganisms.
The EPA, to its credit, at least partially anticipated the advent of synthetic biology and addressed this situation in the preamble to the 1986 Coordinated Framework:
In the case of chemically synthesized genes, the Agency will follow a similar principle. The genetic sequence of the synthesized gene may be identical to a sequence known to occur in an organism in the same genus as the recipient microorganism. If so, the resulting microorganism will be considered intrageneric. . . . Conversely, the sequence of the synthesized gene may be different or not known to be identical to a sequence in the genus of the recipient microorganism. In this case, the resulting product will be considered inter-generic. 150 However, this language was in the preamble and is not consistent with the regulatory language, which only requires a MCAN for an "intergeneric" microorganism, which is defined in the regulation as "a microorganism that is formed by the deliberate combination of genetic material originally isolated from organisms of different taxonomic genera." 151 Because the MCAN regulations state that they "establish[] all reporting requirements [for] microorganisms," 152 non-intergeneric genetically modified microorganisms currently are not covered by any TSCA premanufacture notice requirements. Synthetic biology modifications, however, may have a greater probability of creating a novel risk than most intrageneric transfers exempt from regulation. 153 Synthetic biology microorganisms thus create potential gaps in the current regulatory structure that do not exist for traditional genetically modified organisms.
that the products of biotechnology should be regulated based on the product itself, not based on the process by which it was made. Coordinated Framework 
C. LIFE-CYCLE ANALYSIS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY MICROBES UNDER TSCA
Like any product, synthetic biology microbes have the potential to create environmental or health risks across various stages of their life-cycle. Although no specific risks for synthetic biology microbes have been identified to date, if such risks emerge, the EPA will need to use its existing TSCA authority to address those risks. This section evaluates the potential application of, and possible challenges in applying, the pertinent regulatory provisions of TSCA to each stage of the synthetic biology microbe life-cycle.
Research and Development
At the research and development stage, the manufacturer of a synthetic biology microbe strain generally must submit a TSCA Experimental Release Application to the EPA at least 60 days prior to any field testing of a new strain. 154 The EPA then has 60 days to review the submission. 155 A key challenge for this field testing requirement for all genetically engineered microbes, including synthetic biology ones, is that any risks that escape the EPA's notice at the field testing stage could result in a permanent and even growing problem given the capability of living microorganisms to reproduce and proliferate. Thus, the consequences of any problem at the field testing stage could be much larger for microbes than for the traditional chemical substances for which TSCA was designed, where a problem at this stage would generally be limited to the usually small quantity of chemical used in a field test.
Imposing significant regulatory costs and burdens at the early stage of research and development, however, could have adverse impacts on innovation as many products never leave this stage and never become commercialized. The EPA must strike a delicate (and inevitably not always optimal) balance between precaution and innovation in implementing the TERA review for synthetic biology microorganisms. The increased uncertainties about the risks from synthetic biology relative to "traditional" genetically modified microbes will exacerbate this tension.
A related challenge in the research and development stage is how thoroughly and effectively the EPA can identify and address any risks created by the field testing of synthetic biology microbe products in the 60-day window provided to the agency under the TERA process. Unlike other products, such as traditional chemicals, which can be quickly evaluated by existing models, 156 there are no such screening methods for synthetic biology 156. The EPA screens new chemicals based on structure activity relationships, which informs the agency of potential risks of a new chemical based on an extensive experiential database on the relationship between various molecular chemical structures and toxicity. U.S. GOV'T products. As the EPA recognized in 1983, even before the Coordinated Framework had been published, "[s]tructure activity analyses, which form the backbone of the PMN review, will not be sufficient for analyzing risks of living organisms. Therefore, [the EPA] would have to treat each substance on a caseby-case basis." 157 Given the variety and complexity of genetic manipulations made possible by synthetic biology, combined with the lack of a methodology or even track record on which to base its determinations, the EPA's capability to reliably assess risks of field testing synthetic biology microbes in the 60 days provided by the TERA process is questionable. 158 Moreover, there are two exceptions to TSCA's research and development stage requirements that raise issues for synthetic biology microorganisms. First, chemical substances used in research and development that are not manufactured "for commercial purposes" are exempt from TSCA's premanufacture notice requirements. 159 "Commercial purpose" is defined broadly by the EPA under TSCA to include any production of chemical substances "with the purpose of obtaining an immediate or eventual commercial advantage." 160 Private, non-"commercial purpose" activities, however, are beyond TSCA's scope. 161 This is a particular concern for synthetic biology because many expect synthetic biology to popularize and decentralize the development of new organisms, leading to greater noncommercial activity. 162 Traditional genetic engineering requires substantial expertise, expensive laboratory equipment, and funding. Synthetic biology is likely to be available to anyone with a spare room and a few hundred dollars, spawning the so-called "DIY Bio" movement, which is expected to involve much non-commercial experimentation. 163 The inability to reach noncommercial activities thus presents a significant gap in the regulation of synthetic biology microbes.
The EPA's definition of "commercial purpose" thus does not reach all expected synthetic biology activities, and the definition itself may be subject to statutory or constitutional challenge on its breadth. As one example, the International Genetically Engineered Machine ("iGEM") competition is an annual synthetic biology competition that involves thousands of undergraduate students building biological systems out of a set of biological parts. 164 Because this or similar competitions may not involve a "commercial purpose," the engineered microbes developed as a part of such activities may not be subject to TSCA. 165 Though this potential gap is pertinent to other technologies as well, synthetic biology is expected to enable more widespread non-commercial research than many other fields involving the development of chemical substances.
Second, the TERA requirements include an exception for certain enclosed uses. 166 As discussed above, synthetic biology algae may be grown in open or enclosed systems. Certain research and development activities concerning synthetic biology bioremediation products may take place in enclosed environments, and most research and development for synthetic biology chemical production presumably will as well. Given the increased complexity and uncertainty about risks that synthetic biology products may present, the EPA may need to reconsider whether contained field tests of synthetic biology products should be exempted from the TERA requirement. On the other hand, such an exemption may provide an incentive for product developers to turn to contained field tests, which are likely to be the safest option.
A final issue specific to synthetic biology research and development is that some synthetic biology products may include biological containment systems designed to limit the growth of the organisms outside of a controlled environment. The TERA regulations treat "inactivation controls," which would encompass biological containment, as equivalent to contained use, but do not provide much detail on how effective such a control system must be. 167 It may be appropriate to revise the TERA regulations to better elaborate and encourage such additional safety measures.
Pre-Commercial Notification
The most significant regulatory controls the EPA possesses under TSCA concerning synthetic biology microbes are the pre-commercialization notification requirements. TSCA section 5 authorizes the EPA to regulate new hazardous chemical substances where "the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of" the substance presents an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. 168 Where a chemical substance "presents an unreasonable risk," the EPA may prohibit or limit the 164 amount of its manufacture or use. 169 Even this authority, however, is limited and could be problematic if synthetic biology microbes present significant risks.
As noted above, the developer of a new synthetic biology microbe involving the intergeneric transfer of genetic material must submit a Microbial Commercial Activity Notice to the EPA at least 90 days prior to commercialization. 170 The EPA then has 90 days to make a determination on whether the product will present an unreasonable risk to human health or the environment. 171 Like the traditional premanufacture notice requirement for conventional chemicals from which it is derived through TSCA section 5, the MCAN imposes no affirmative duty on the product developer to generate any safety information, but rather only requires the developer to submit known and reasonably available data. 172 There are ongoing concerns that the EPA lacks sufficient authority to provide a meaningful safety review in 90 days in the absence of mandatory data requirements, and such concerns are even greater for synthetic biology microbes. 173 Unlike traditional chemicals, which the EPA usually evaluates using existing risk assessment models, 174 the EPA lacks any existing methodology or data set against which to evaluate the risks of novel synthetic biology products. 175 Moreover, while PMN analyses for chemicals focus on human toxicity, most significant risk scenarios for synthetic biology algae and bioremediation products involve environmental releases that may result in some form of ecological harm. 176 Such concerns are much more difficult to study and predict than human health risks. 177 Because the burden of proof of establishing a reasonable basis is on the EPA, reaching a finding of an unreasonable risk to health or the environment from synthetic biology microbes, particularly within this limited time frame, will be a significant challenge. It will be especially challenging in the early stages of synthetic 169 biology development, as the data and understanding concerning synthetic biology risk analysis are lacking or are limited. In many cases, it may be impossible to understand certain synthetic biology microbe risks well until the technology develops further. Accordingly, there are serious doubts about the EPA's ability to identify and manage any risks that synthetic biology microbes may present using the existing MCAN mechanism.
Notwithstanding the limitations on the EPA's authority under section 5 of TSCA, the EPA has been innovative in leveraging that authority to engage product manufacturers in more proactive and collaborative safety measures. A good example is how the EPA has used its TSCA section 5 authority for nanomaterials, which have some similarities to synthetic biology microbes in that they present greater uncertainties about risk that are not amenable to being addressed using conventional risk modeling techniques. The EPA has nevertheless used its TSCA section 5 authority to persuade product manufacturers to enter into consent decrees in which the manufacturers agree to undertake additional safety measures, such as various worker protection measures (e.g., the use of personal protective equipment), conduct subchronic toxicity studies on the products, and impose restrictions on product use. 178 A similar approach could be developed for synthetic biology products that might come under the EPA's TSCA authority, but the challenge will be in developing a set of reasonable safety measures that can help assure the safety of the products without unduly burdening the product's commercialization. Again, because certain synthetic biology microbes primarily involve potential ecological rather than human health risks, this might be a more difficult undertaking than was the case for the EPA's treatment of nanomaterials.
Despite these significant limitations, the MCAN requirement is the EPA's most effective and powerful regulatory tool for ensuring the safety of synthetic biology microorganisms. It will be necessary for the EPA to bulk up this program with additional staff, resources, expertise, and research if it is to use its authority effectively to oversee the expected impending wave of innovative synthetic biology microbial products.
Safety Testing
Beyond the pre-commercialization requirements discussed above, the EPA's ability to require manufacturers to engage in any safety testing is very limited. Pursuant to TSCA section 4, the EPA may require that a product manufacturer conduct and report testing with respect to human health and environmental effects if a chemical substance either: (1) may present an "unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment"; or (2) "will be produced in substantial quantities" and "may reasonably be anticipated to enter the environment in substantial quantities" or result in "substantial human exposure." 179 Such testing, however, can only be required after the EPA has sufficient data to meet its burden to show there may be a problem and the EPA makes a finding that existing available data are "insufficient" to determine or predict the health and environmental effects of the product. 180 In addition, the EPA must find that testing is "necessary to develop such data." 181 These requirements put a substantial evidentiary burden on the EPA before it can require a product manufacturer to conduct testing. Based on historical precedent, it often takes the EPA approximately ten years from start to finish to adopt and implement a test rule under TSCA section 4. 182 The "unreasonable risk" standard is often the biggest obstacle for such a test rule, and this will likely also be the case for synthetic biology microbes. The EPA is rarely able to make a finding that a chemical substance for which it is seeking more safety data presents an "unreasonable risk"-if the EPA had sufficient data to make such a finding, it would not need to undertake more testing, but rather proceed with more direct regulatory action. 183 For these reasons, the EPA almost always supports section 4 testing requirements using the second trigger-that the product "will be produced in substantial quantities" and "may reasonably be anticipated to enter the environment in substantial quantities" or "result in substantial human exposure." The substantial quantity measures, however, are set by statute and regulated based upon traditional chemical quantities and a direct relationship between mass and risk, 184 thresholds that are inappropriate for synthetic biology microbes. Further, the expectation is that in many cases synthetic biology microbes will be used in controlled and contained environments, unlike traditional chemical substances, and thus if substantial environmental release and human exposure occurs, the regulatory and risk 179. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i) (2012). The substantial production threshold is "1 million pounds, aggregate production volume of the substance per year for all manufacturers"; the substantial release threshold is "1 million pounds of release to the environment from all sources per year; or release equal to or greater than 10 percent of production volume per year, whichever is lower." TSCA Section 4(a) (1) management systems will have already failed. It is likely that for many synthetic biology microbes the EPA will both lack a reasonable basis to conclude that the microbes present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment and that production of the microbe will fall below the quantitative production threshold. 185 In these cases, the EPA lacks statutory authority to require further testing concerning human health and environmental impacts of synthetic biology microbes.
Post-Market Surveillance and Risk Management
TSCA provides limited authority for the EPA to conduct post-market surveillance and risk management of regulated products such as synthetic biology microbes. TSCA section 8 provides a series of reporting and recordkeeping requirements, some of which could be important for oversight of synthetic biology microbes. For example, section 8(c) requires the manufacturer or distributor of a product to keep "records of significant adverse reactions to health or the environment alleged to have been caused by" their product. 186 EPA regulations limit such recordkeeping to "known" human health effects and a variety of environmental effects, including:
(1) Gradual or sudden changes in the composition of animal life or plant life, including fungal or microbial organisms, in an area.
(2) Abnormal number of deaths of organisms (e.g., fish kills). Several of these triggers would presumably apply to any accidental environmental release of, or adverse effects from, synthetic biology microbes, such as alterations in the distribution of a species or long-lasting contamination of the environment. However, the effectiveness of this provision is limited in two key ways. First, a company is only required to maintain records of allegations of such effects, and not to itself identify or mitigate such effects. 188 Second, the company is only required to retain the information and is not required to report the allegations to the EPA. Section 8(e) of TSCA requires the manufacturer or distributor of a product to report to the EPA any information that "reasonably supports the conclusion that [the chemical] substance or mixture presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the environment." 190 The EPA has not issued regulations implementing section 8(e) to date, so it is not clear precisely what type of scenarios relating to synthetic biology microbes would trigger reporting requirements under this provision. However, given the statutory language of "substantial risk," as well as the historical implementation of this provision, it is likely that results showing actual or serious potential for harm would be required, and this may not encompass some of the key incidents that would be important to report to the EPA about synthetic biology microbes, such as unintended environmental releases that may not trigger section 8(e) but which nevertheless may be of concern to the EPA.
If the EPA identifies potential post-marketing risks associated with synthetic biology microbes, it potentially could take regulatory action under section 6 of TSCA to attempt to manage those risks. Section 6 of TSCA gives the EPA an extensive menu of potential risk management options including prohibition of a product, restrictions on the quantity or use of a product, requirements for labeling or communicating the risks of a product, restrictions on product disposal, testing requirements, and reporting requirements. 191 However, to impose such a requirement, the EPA must make a finding based on a quantified cost-benefit calculation that the product poses an "unreasonable risk," 192 and moreover that the proposed regulatory action is the least burdensome for protecting against the unreasonable risk. 193 As enforced by the courts, these requirements are very difficult for the agency to satisfy. 194 Indeed, the EPA has issued rules under section 6 for only five chemicals since the statute was enacted in 1976 (polychlorinated biphenyls, fully halogenated chlorofluoroalkanes, dioxin, asbestos, and hexavalent chromium). 195 One of these, a proposed ban on certain asbestos products, was based on ten years of study and a 45,000-page record, but was struck down by a federal appeals court in 1991 for lacking sufficient cost-benefit analysis and not imposing the least burdensome regulation. 196 The EPA has not tried to exercise this authority subsequently. For these reasons, TSCA (or the judicial interpretation of TSCA) has been criticized by commentators for imposing unrealistic data and certainty requirements. 197 Considering the limited scientific knowledge concerning the risks of synthetic biology microbes, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the EPA to conduct the necessary cost-benefit analysis to satisfy the least burdensome regulation requirement.
The lack of serious post-commercialization surveillance or authority represents a significant concern for synthetic biology microbes, particularly bioremediation or algae products that may be intentionally placed into the open environment. Organisms can evolve. 198 A synthetic biology microbe may mutate, creating both a new organism and new chemical products produced by that organism, all without the manufacturer's or the EPA's knowledge. These new organisms and chemical products could have different risk profiles than the intended products. Developers may be able to design synthetic biology microbes so that the risk of evolution is low, but biological controls can fail. 199 In addition, because of some of the potential regulatory gaps and exemptions discussed above, regulators may not have appropriately evaluated synthetic biology microbes' risks related to evolution and other concerns in the first instance. 200 This represents a major gap for the regulatory oversight of synthetic biology microbes under TSCA-if a risk exists and the EPA fails to identify and address that risk in the brief MCAN window of opportunity, or if the EPA never had an opportunity to assess the risk, the agency may be without any effective regulatory authority to recognize or manage subsequent damage.
Disposal
The final stage of a product life-cycle is disposal, which could represent a significant risk scenario for synthetic biology microbes. If large quantities of algae are processed to produce fuels, industrial chemicals, or bioremediation products, the residual biomass must be disposed of in some manner and could consist of relatively large quantities of materials. If some living cells survive the processing step, they may exist in the waste material and potentially grow and proliferate if not properly handled. 201 TSCA section 6 does provide for risk management actions necessary to ensure the safe disposal of a material, but such requirements can only be imposed under the strict risk-benefit criteria of section 6. These requirements make it unlikely that such risk management 199. See supra notes 33−37 and accompanying text. 200. It is possible that there have already been genetically modified microbes produced through traditional rDNA techniques that raise similar issues, but there does not appear to be any publicly available information on such.
201. See Snow & Smith, supra note 44, at 766.
can ever be imposed for synthetic biology microbes (or any other product) under the existing statutory provision. Other statutes, however, also govern product disposal, a topic considered below. 202 
D. TSCA'S OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS AND RELEVANCE
TSCA is the most applicable and relevant statutory program for regulating any potential health and environmental risks from synthetic biology microbes. Given the limits inherent in the current statute and regulations, however, the EPA will have a very difficult role to play under TSCA, both in adequately protecting against human health and environmental risks and in balancing the need to conduct adequate risk assessments against the desire to permit this nascent technology to develop without undue regulatory burdens.
It is not clear at this stage whether and to what extent synthetic biology microbes will present significant risks. If the risks of such products are small and manageable, the existing MCAN mechanism may be sufficient to protect public health and the environment. But, to the extent synthetic biology microbes create unanticipated or significant risks, the MCAN process and other existing TSCA statutory provisions are likely deficient in anticipating and managing those risks.
Many have criticized TSCA as an ineffective and outdated regulatory framework for regulating toxic substances generally. 203 There is now some consensus that the statute needs a comprehensive revision, and there have been a number of bills introduced in Congress recently, garnering widespread support, to substantially strengthen TSCA. 204 While there are important differences in the bills introduced to date, the general direction of the revisions is to require manufacturers of chemical substances to produce a minimum set of safety data before commercializing their products. 205 The proposed legislation will also ease the procedural and substantive burdens on the EPA to promulgate risk management rules under TSCA section 6. These revisions, if adopted, would significantly enhance the ability of TSCA to regulate synthetic biology microbes, although the precise implications for synthetic biology will depend on the final details of any legislation that Congress enacts.
III. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY REGULATION BEYOND TSCA
In addition to TSCA, several additional human health and environmental statutes are pertinent to the regulation of synthetic biology microbes engineered for biofuels, chemical production, and bioremediation. These statutes include the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; the Endangered Species Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. 206 In addition, the National Institutes of Health also has guidelines pertinent to the handling of synthetic biology microorganisms. 207 As discussed in the following sections, some of these statutes and guidelines are applicable to all types of synthetic biology microbes discussed here, while others are limited to particular synthetic biology applications.
A. THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT
The use of synthetic biology to develop microbes designed for industrial chemical production raises particular concerns under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). FIFRA prohibits the distribution or sale of pesticide products in the United States without EPA registration. 208 FIFRA provides significant authority to the EPA to regulate preregistration research and development; require preregistration testing and data development; prohibit or condition the manufacture of pesticides; require submission of post-registration adverse effects information; and mandate postregistration testing requirements. 209 Unlike TSCA section 5, FIFRA provides the EPA with sufficient authority to obtain risk data from the prospective registrant both pre-and post-registration. These provisions apply only to pesticide products, likely a small subset of the products expected to be produced by synthetic biology.
Though synthetic biology microbes engineered to produce chemical pesticides may not be regulated directly under FIFRA, because the microbe itself is not a pesticide, chemical pesticides produced by such microbes would fall within FIFRA's purview. 210 A pesticide produced by a synthetic biology microbe that has the same chemical composition as an already FIFRA- § 158.740 (microbial pesticides). These would apply where the synthetic biology microbe itself is the pesticide, as opposed to the synthetic biology microbe being used to produce a pesticide product.
registered pesticide would not require a new registration prior to use. 211 To the extent the chemical product is not fully or correctly characterized, or the synthetic biology microbe could unknowingly mutate to produce a slightly different pesticide, manufacture of such a pesticide would be in violation of FIFRA given that the existing approval would not cover the mutated version.
In the absence of ongoing monitoring requirements, however, neither the EPA nor the manufacturer may know about the change until the new pesticide has already been released into the environment. In addition to concerns about an unknown release, current regulations governing preregistration research and development may be inappropriate for synthetic biology microbes. The EPA currently permits small-scale field tests of genetically modified pesticidal organisms through a notification process. 212 Larger field tests, up to 5000 acres, are generally governed by experimental use permits ("EUPs") under FIFRA. 213 Certain activities are exempt from the standard EUP requirements, including tests in laboratories and greenhouses and field trials intended solely to "assess [a] pesticide's potential efficacy, toxicity, or other properties." 214 These general exemptions may be inappropriate given the unique and uncertain risks of synthetic biology microbes engineered to produce pesticides. 215 In particular, due to their potential to reproduce, the field trial of a problematic synthetic biology microbe could produce environmental contamination both by the microbe and its produced chemical product that is extremely difficult or impossible to remediate. The EPA has operated a similar notification system for pest control microbes that are genetically engineered via traditional rDNA processes and has not found this problematic, though most of the registered microbes engineered through traditional genetic engineering techniques could not viably reproduce. 216 
B. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Due to the potential for competition and interaction with natural organisms, the intentional release of synthetic biology organisms into the environment for bioremediation purposes, or synthetic biology algae raised in open environments, could raise concerns under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). 217 ESA protects listed endangered and threatened species in two general ways. First, section 7 of ESA prevents federal agencies from taking any action that would jeopardize a listed species. 218 Second, section 9 of ESA prohibits private entities from taking any action that might kill or harm a listed species, absent an acceptable mitigation plan. 219 ESA section 7 applies to federal agency action, which includes federal agency decisions to grant permits and to federal agency funding of private activities. 220 Section 7 is primarily procedural, requiring federal agencies to ensure through consultation that their actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or its habitat. 221 Section 7 decisionmaking must be based on the "best scientific and commercial data available" and does not mandate the development of new data in the face of uncertain or unknown risks. 222 A federal agency's intentional release of synthetic biology organisms for bioremediation, or a private party's release pursuant to a permit or funding from a federal agency such as the EPA, could trigger section 7's requirements of consultation with the agencies responsible for implementation of ESA. 223 ESA section 9 makes it unlawful to "take" a listed species, which is defined broadly to include killing, harming, or producing significant habitat degradation. 224 The release of synthetic biology organisms into the environment that could harm listed species, or that could result in the destruction of food sources or habitat of endangered or threatened species, could constitute a taking under ESA and trigger both civil and criminal liability. 225 In some cases, this may require the entity desiring the release to obtain a Habitat Conservation Plan ("HCP"), which may allow for the incidental taking of listed species so long as the effects of the taking are minimized and mitigated, and are consistent with a number of additional requirements. 226 certain individuals of a listed species, in an effort to better protect the species as a whole (e.g., by preventing the further spread of a hazardous release), would constitute impermissible harm under section 9 and subject the pertinent actors to civil or criminal penalties, absent an acceptable HCP. 227
C. THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 228 which amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 229 regulates the generation, transportation, management, and disposal (other than to surface water) of solid and hazardous wastes. 230 RCRA also contains groundwater monitoring and corrective action requirements that apply to hazardous waste releases. 231 A waste is subject to RCRA's requirements if it has been listed by the EPA or if it exhibits certain hazardous characteristics, such as those that would pose a threat to human health or the environment. 232 Synthetic biology microbes engineered to produce biofuels, chemical products, or for bioremediation that meet the definition of RCRA hazardous wastes will be subject to RCRA's disposal and other requirements. Most such microbes, however, would not be expected to exhibit hazardous characteristics, and therefore would likely require the EPA listing to be subject to RCRA's purview. 233 The EPA's listing of new hazardous wastes under RCRA is notoriously slow, so it is unlikely that synthetic biology organisms will be listed as hazardous wastes any time soon.
The EPA's current system for regulating generators of solid and hazardous waste under RCRA may raise concerns for synthetic biology. RCRA requirements for generators vary based on the mass of hazardous waste generated. "Large quantity generators," for example, have more stringent notification, contingency plan, and waste storage requirements than "small quantity generators" and "conditionally exempt small quantity 227. In general, the ESA does not take into account economic criteria or any cost-benefit analysis comparing the benefit of a potential activity to its harm. 233. Hazardous waste designations can apply automatically to wastes that meet defined "characteristics" (e.g., toxicity, reactivity, corrosivity, ignitability) or by regulation to wastes specifically listed as hazardous by the EPA. Synthetic biology algae wastes would likely not meet any of the characteristics, so they would have to be listed to be designated as hazardous.
generator [s] ." 234 The EPA's current classification scheme for RCRA waste generators may not be appropriate for synthetic biology products, however, because the toxicity of a synthetic biology microbe may not bear the same relation to mass as for traditional waste.
D. THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") provides a system of remediation and liability for releases of hazardous materials that pose a risk to human health and the environment. 235 CERCLA liability and enforcement authority generally turns on whether a release involves a "hazardous substance," a term defined broadly under the statute. 236 The EPA has the authority to include any substance that "when released into the environment may present substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the environment." 237 However, the EPA must list the specific organism prospectively, before the release occurs, to have any deterrent effect in preventing releases, something the EPA has not yet shown any indication of doing. To the extent a synthetic biology microbe is indeed identified as hazardous or presents hazardous characteristics, it will be subject to CERCLA's requirements if there is a release. CERCLA provides substantial authority to remediate a hazardous release, but by definition is a reactive, not proactive, tool, and therefore is of little assistance except as a deterrent measure in preventing problematic synthetic biology releases.
E. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH GUIDELINES
The U.S. National Institutes of Health ("NIH") could also play a role in managing synthetic biology risks, but its authority is limited in this regard. The NIH has guidelines for constructing and handling recombinant DNA organisms generally, but these guidelines apply only to research conducted by or funded by federal agencies, and do not reach private industry. 238 Although private researchers may voluntarily follow the guidelines, compliance is not required unless the research is federally funded. 239 Thus, private research concerning synthetic biology microbes engineered for chemical production may substantially take place outside of agency oversight. As discussed above, governance of private research activities is of particular concern for synthetic biology because one of the much-anticipated features of synthetic biology is that it will permit a broader spectrum of small private entities and individuals to engage in the engineering of new organisms. While traditional genetic engineering techniques require substantial monetary and laboratory resources, individuals are expected to be able to engage in synthetic biology activities in their home and with limited resources.
Finally, the NIH guidelines only concern contained research and do not give any guidance concerning the deliberate release of microbes into the environment. A private researcher seeking to study microbes in the environment would not even have any best practices or guidance available concerning appropriate protective measures to take.
IV. INNOVATIVE SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY GOVERNANCE
The previous Part reveals that, as was the case with the first generations of genetically engineered products, a matrix of existing statutes and regulatory programs exist to provide regulatory oversight of synthetic biology products. However, as was also the case for the earlier generation of genetically engineered products, 240 the existing statutory matrix has various gaps and mismatches for synthetic biology, perhaps even greater than those for the first generation of genetically engineered products. And, familiar battle lines are already being drawn. Various public interest and advocacy groups are expressing concern and mobilizing opposition to synthetic biology, calling for application of the precautionary principle to impose an immediate "moratorium on the release and commercial use" of synthetic biology. 241 On the other hand, President Obama's Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues has rejected applying the precautionary principle for synthetic biology (as well as its opposite "extreme" of no oversight), and instead has called for "responsible stewardship" and "prudent vigilance" of synthetic biology. 242 Absent some unexpected tragedy or disaster, there is unlikely to be sufficient impetus for major statutory overhaul or change in the near future, except perhaps for the major revisions to TSCA that are pending in Congress. 243 This is not surprising: major statutory or regulatory change is politically difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. Further, the uncertainties about the technological trajectory and risks of synthetic biology, the wide range of products and applications, and the promising 240. See generally Mandel, supra note 39. 241. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH ET AL., THE PRINCIPLES FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGYenvironmental, health, and economic benefits of synthetic biology all counsel against major new regulatory impositions at this time. 244 However, this necessary lack of regulation may create what the International Risk Governance Council has described as "risk governance deficits." 245 While new regulatory provisions may be premature, other types of innovative "soft law" measures could help to fill the current gaps until such time as the need for, and focus of, formal regulation has been better delineated. 246 Soft law measures can produce flexible interim (or long-term) measures that can more rapidly enable a sound oversight system. In addition to allowing a promising technology to develop while protecting human health and the environment, such measures can also help to maintain public confidence, provide industry with some certainty concerning regulatory requirements, and assure investors that the technology will be developed safely and without unduly restrictive regulatory burdens. 247 Soft law measures can include voluntary programs, consensus standards, partnership programs, codes of conducts, principles, and certification programs. They can impose substantive expectations or requirements, but unlike traditional "hard law" government regulations, soft law measures are not directly enforceable. Soft law approaches often overlap with "new governance" modes of oversight, which expand oversight from government to broaden responsibility to other stakeholders including industry actors, nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"), and other third parties and experts. 248 As the Presidential Commission noted, the rapidly developing pace of synthetic biology requires an iterative response, in which "decisions [are] revisited and amended as warranted by additional information about risks and potential benefits." 249 These soft law and governance approaches have a number of potential advantages, 250 including that they can often be adopted more rapidly and amended more quickly than traditional regulation, providing a more adaptive oversight system. 251 Unlike traditional laws, soft law measures can often be extended beyond national and regional boundaries, and are usually based on a collaborative rather than adversarial model. The Presidential Commission noted that "[s]elf-regulation also promotes a moral sense of ownership within a professional culture of responsibility." 252 Soft law approaches should not be considered a panacea-there are some potential disadvantages in addition to the advantages that soft law can provide. For example, such measures may not provide the normal procedural safeguards that are an important part of traditional regulation and may reduce transparency or exclude relevant stakeholders from the decisionmaking process. In addition, traditional regulation has important secondary benefits beyond its primary objective of protecting public health and the environment, such as by providing consumer confidence that a technology or industry is being kept in check by government regulation and providing certainty to companies and investors about regulatory requirements. There is some evidence that voluntary soft law programs are less effective than traditional regulation in providing these secondary benefits. Studies have shown that the public has less confidence in voluntary programs providing adequate oversight than those that are mandatory. 253 Companies involved in some aspects of synthetic biology, such as gene synthesis companies, have already instituted some innovative self-regulatory programs to prevent misuse of synthetic DNA for bioterrorism or other malevolent uses. 254 Similar innovative ideas using soft law approaches would be helpful to begin addressing the types of environmental risks from the synthetic biology applications discussed here, such as algae biofuels and bioremediation. Over time, these soft law approaches, which can be established relatively quickly and without a lot of red tape, can gradually be hardened into more traditional "hard law" regulatory requirements. 255 One approach would be an industry-NGO partnership similar to the NanoRisk Framework that was developed jointly by a large product manufacturer, DuPont, and a leading environmental organization, the Environmental Defense Fund. 256 This partnership provided a publicly available framework for nanotechnology companies to undertake "a systematic and disciplined process" for evaluating and addressing the risks of their products using nanoscale materials. 257 The participation of both an industry and NGO partner helped to ensure this framework was reasonable, effective, and credible. As an example of how such soft law programs can gradually harden into more formal requirements, the International Organization for Standardization recently incorporated the NanoRisk Framework into its nanotechnology risk management standard. 258 In the same way, a credible and balanced risk assessment and management tool for synthetic biology jointly developed by one or more industry and NGO participants could provide a standard for synthetic biology safety assessments that eventually becomes adopted by regulatory agencies.
Another soft law approach would be to establish some type of "issue manager," consisting of a multi-stakeholder coordinating body, that would be helpful to orchestrate the research and regulatory actions of the various governmental agencies that may have some oversight responsibilities for synthetic biology. 259 An instructive precedent might be the National Nanotechnology Initiative ("NNI"), including its National Nanotechnology Coordination Office ("NNCO") that provides administrative support and coordination, and the Nanoscale Science, Engineering, and Technology ("NSET") Subcommittee composed of representatives of federal agencies with an interest in nanotechnology. 260 The NNI with its various subcomponents serves as a focus for media, industry, and interested stakeholders to interact with the government and each other on issues relating to nanotechnology, including safety and regulatory issues. The NNI also coordinates important initiatives such as research and development planning and coordination, and even issues guidance such as a common definition of nanotechnology. A similar coordinating body for synthetic biology would likewise help to provide some coherence and central organization for the rapidly evolving and sprawling field of synthetic biology. 261 This could consist of a multi-agency coordinating committee within the federal government to develop consistent and coordinated research, technology assistance, and regulatory goals and approaches.
A slightly different and narrower institutional innovation would be to create an international scientific advisory board to study and provide periodic assessments of the scientific data on the benefits, risks, and uncertainties associated with synthetic biology. This body would provide an authoritative, scientific snapshot that could be used as common ground by regulators, legislators, industry, NGOs, and journalists to anchor their activities on synthetic biology. Leading scientists involved in studying synthetic biology safety are currently being called upon to provide their advice to a multitude of different forums and efforts, but centralizing the scientific assessment in one entity would provide for economy of scale by enabling all leading scientists to participate in the scientific assessment in a more efficient and streamlined approach. 262 Since synthetic biology raises many of the same risk issues in countries all over the globe, 263 it would also make sense to make this scientific-assessment body international in scope and membership. If nations base their policies on the same scientific assessments, they are more likely to adopt consistent regulatory programs. 264 Similar international scientificassessment entities have been created for assessing climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC")) 265 and biodiversity (Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services), 266 and have been proposed for other emerging technologies such as nanotechnology. 267 Another useful initiative might be some sort of private-public partnership to develop the data and risk assessment models that agencies such as the EPA need to provide effective regulatory oversight. While statutes such as TSCA do have various deficiencies as outlined above, the biggest impediment agencies are likely to face with synthetic biology are the uncertainties and novelty in trying to assess product risks. All synthetic biology products are unlikely to be dangerous and thus across-the-board restrictions are likely to do more harm than good. Rather, agencies need the capability to identify the products and scenarios most likely to present significant risks and to identify risk management options that can adequately control those risks. To achieve this, agencies need better data and risk assessment methods. Given that it is also in industry's interest for the government to develop this more fine-tuned and effective regulatory focus, 268 there should be opportunity and common interest in industry and government pooling their expertise and resources to develop the tools necessary to better predict and manage synthetic biology risks proactively. A relevant precedent might be the NanoSafety Consortium for Carbon ("NCC"). The NCC is a voluntary industry association with the objective of working with the EPA to generate knowledge and safety data that will enable the EPA to administer a more informed, effective, and efficient oversight scheme of carbon nanotechnology products. 269 As with synthetic biology, the impetus for the creation of the NCC was the lack of validated screening tests for a new category of products that needed to be reviewed by the EPA under section 5 of the TSCA. 270 The standard screening tools that the EPA uses for new chemicals under section 5, such as structure activity relationship analysis, 271 were not applicable to nanotechnology (or synthetic biology) because toxicity or risk is not based primarily on the chemical structure of the product. Given the lack of simple screening tests and the substantial uncertainties about nanotechnology risks (or even how to test for them), the EPA had no alternative but to review such products in a resource-and time-intensive, case-by-case manner. 272 This approach, while necessary at this time, potentially imposes burdensome and 268. Companies producing products that must receive regulatory approval benefit from the stability and certainty that an evidence-based regulatory system provides. For example, if a company produces a product that imposes unreasonable risks that are not detected during regulatory approval, the producer of that risky technology may benefit in the short-term, but in the long-term will likely be adversely affected by costly recalls, liability, and damage to its reputation and brand name.
269. NANOSAFETY CONSORTIUM FOR CARBON, http://www.nanosafetyconsortium.com/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2014). For example, one of the most common categories of carbon nanotechnology materials are carbon nanotubes, which are very thin cylindrical forms of carbon that have "unique strength, electrical, and thermal properties" that the EPA could learn more about through working with a multi-disciplinary association as discussed above. perhaps duplicative testing requirements on each new product and creates a substantial regulatory bottleneck. 273 In response to prodding from the EPA, 12 companies in the industry grouped together to create the NCC. 274 They developed the NCC to work with the EPA and leading scientists to develop a mutually agreeable test program for a representative set of carbon nanomaterials. The program intended to reduce testing costs while nevertheless providing the EPA sufficient data to make informed decisions. 275 To build public trust, the NCC is committed to transparency and independence, using the best sources of scientific information and publishing all results, favorable or not, in the open literature. 276 A similar model could be developed for synthetic biology products: companies planning to submit new products to the EPA for approval under TSCA section 5 could work with the EPA and independent scientists in a voluntary program to develop data sets and test methods that could be used to streamline the EPA review of synthetic biology products. This type of program could provide a win-win solution whereby industry can be assured of a less burdensome and speedier product approval system while at the same time the EPA has better tools and data to ensure public safety.
Finally, although this Article has primarily focused on specific regulatory instruments and approaches, mention must be given to the importance of public opinion concerning the future prospects for synthetic biology. 277 Public opinion can play a critical role in the progress of synthetic biologypublic confidence in the oversight of the technology can help assure the success and many potentials of synthetic biology, whereas public mistrust and fears can seriously impede development of the technology, as was the case with genetically modified foods in Europe. 278 There is widespread recognition that public and stakeholder engagement must be built into any oversight system, but designing and structuring such opportunities for effective and meaningful public participation remain a major challenge. 279 
CONCLUSION
As indicated by the discussion above, the EPA's ability to adequately regulate synthetic biology microbes will be substantially dependent on the
